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The Mechanisms of the Optional Protocol to the Genocide 
Convention and its links to R2P 
 
 
 
JEAN-FRANÇOIS BUSSIÈRE-WALLOT
1
 
 
 
 
 
The Optional Protocol to the Genocide Convention was drafted taking into account 
the UN Charter and practice to fit neatly into the UN and regional system. This is 
done by respecting the various roles and powers assigned to the General Assembly, 
the Security Council and the Regional Organizations under the UN Charter. The 
specific roles of each under the Protocol will be discussed, as well as the specific 
mechanisms for Regional Organizations under Article 5. The decision-making on 
genocide and its preparatory steps under Article 3, working in conjunction with 
Article 4, creates an obligation to act on normally non-binding recommendations by 
the UN General Assembly or by a relevant Regional Organization, assuming the 
Security Council fails to act. The Protocol also addresses potential peacekeeping 
issues in emergency genocide prevention or suppression to ensure the effective 
protection of civilians and the funding of such missions. This presentation also 
discussed the links between the Optional Protocol and the Responsibility to Protect. 
 
 
Greg Stanton has already explained to great length why we feel this proposal is 
necessary
2
. What I want to do is explain the scope of the protocol, its mechanisms and its 
relationship with the UN Charter as well as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Wherever 
possible, I’ll link my explanation of the Protocol and its mechanisms to examples of how 
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that could work. Please keep in mind that a lot of its provisions are meant to be flexible 
and adaptable. The Protocol intentionally leaves a lot of room for policy decisions so that 
it can remain pertinent as the field of genocide prevention evolves, but also as the world 
and international law evolve. It is similar in that respect to the Responsibility to Protect, 
largely because it is inspired by it, and rather than focusing on a specific solution, seeks 
to provide tools to alleviate risks of genocide while also integrating the norm of R2P 
within the folds of international law. R2P is already much linked with international law 
currently, because it is a norm which is inspired from the legal obligations States and 
other international actors have to respect the Conventions and covenants they have 
signed, such as the Geneva and Genocide Conventions, and because it draws on the legal 
vocabulary of state responsibility. In practice however, R2P is much more of a political 
commitment not to tolerate violations of the most important norms of international law 
protecting human rights, and in particular, the right to life
3
. 
The Scope of the Protocol 
Let’s start with mentioning briefly the scope of the Protocol. It has three principal 
mechanisms that deal with preventing or halting genocide. The three principal 
mechanisms involve cooperation in the prevention of genocide through information 
sharing and leadership training
4
, establishing institutions to rapidly recognize situations 
that may lead to genocide
5
 and strengthening both the regional mechanisms for 
intervention in the event of genocide, and the cooperation between the UN and regional 
organizations
6
. I will discuss each of the mechanisms in turn while linking them to the 
appropriate decision-making bodies and illustrating how that might work out. Because 
the Genocide Convention, through measures like criminalizing incitement
7
, addresses the 
first pillar of R2P which is the question of state responsibility to protect its population 
from genocide, the Protocol focusses more on the two other pillars of R2P, namely the 
responsibility of the international community to assist the state in fulfilling its protection 
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5
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3 
obligations and if necessary, to take collective action
8
. 
 
The Preventive Aspect 
The main disposition for early prevention is found in Article 2 which aims to create an 
international network in genocide prevention. According to Article 2 (a), states would 
have to monitor and document genocide and early warning signs of genocide… wherever 
they may occur. This would include information regarding the other crimes that are war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, if only for the reason that some of those crimes may 
overlap with genocide acts if the intent is there. This information would then be freely 
shared with Regional Organizations and Multilateral Organizations of which the 
signatory states are members if those organizations conduct genocide prevention
9
. These 
organizations could be traditional regional ones like the European Union or the African 
Union, they could be sub-regional organizations and they could be non-regional as well, 
provided they are involved in genocide prevention in one form or another. 
Cooperation would also be done between the national level and the UN, between the 
regional or multilateral organizations and the UN, as well as between regional 
organizations
10
. From a legal point of view, binding an international organization through 
a treaty is tricky, since non-state international actors like the UN and regional 
organizations are not always explicitly allowed to join a treaty, and therefore are hard to 
bind by treaties they haven’t signed. For an example of this, let me just point you out to 
the decades-long debate over whether, or how much, the UN is or is not bound by the two 
human rights covenants it helped to negotiate or whether its peacekeepers need to respect 
international humanitarian law. 
The approach I took was a very practical one: make it an explicit state responsibility to 
get the various organizations, whether regional or multilateral, that are involved with 
genocide prevention, to talk to one another and likewise share information
11
. In some 
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4 
cases it may require getting enough states in an organization on board with the protocol 
for the cooperation to be mandated by the treaty, if only because those organizations need 
to follow their own rules; in practice, I don’t expect it to be a major issue. The European 
Union and the African Union talk to one another, the U.S. Department of State at times 
works with sub-regional African organizations and the Latin American Network for 
Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention is in contact with the UN, for example. 
Likewise, the individual state actors would have to collaborate among each other
12
. One 
particular issue I singled out for cooperation between state parties is the criminal 
activities of militias and organizations operating across their national boundaries
13
, since 
those can often be involved in attacks on civilians, or are génocidaires themselves. As an 
example of this, let me just point to the militias in East Congo, some of whom were 
active in the Rwandan genocide
14
. 
The Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide would serve as the 
center of contact at the UN, for obvious reasons. It would coordinate UN prevention and 
suppression of genocide, dispatch the information to the appropriate UN agencies, as well 
as offer leadership training on risk assessment and genocide prevention to those states 
and organizations which need it
15
. He would also ensure that urgent information reaches 
the media and the public, he would also make it available to NGO’s involved in human 
rights, humanitarian activities, or which have otherwise declared themselves interested by 
that information. Those organizations would be taken straight from the list of those in 
consultative status with ECOSOC or associated with the UN Department of Public 
Information, since there’s no need to create an extra structure when one is already in 
place.  
One word about the graphic: it may look hierarchical, but that’s mostly due to my modest 
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5 
illustration skills
16
. What you need to envision is a global network, a web, of national, 
regional and multilateral actors coming together for the purpose of early warning and 
genocide prevention, with civil society acting as a check and watchdog for inaction. The 
goal is to ensure that the efforts which are being deployed in some regions become 
global, but also that they are sustained through time. This section gives legal weight to 
pillar 2 of the R2P by bringing the international community to help national actors with 
early warning, and also implements effectively paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, in which the larger international community committed not just to pillar 2, but 
also to help the United Nations establish an early warning capability
17
. It also addresses 
two challenges which are recurrent in implementing R2P, namely insufficient 
international, regional and local capacity to prevent atrocities as well as the systematic 
gaps in communication and cooperation among actors involved in prevention and early 
warning. 
 
Quick Recognition of Genocide 
The second mechanism aims at establishing institutions to rapidly recognize situations 
that may lead to genocide. Under the Genocide Convention’s Article VIII, the states 
which are party to the Convention “may call on the competent organs of the UN to take 
such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the 
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide”. The key word here is may, in other 
words at the present, they may as well do nothing, or at least nothing that has to do with 
the larger international community. We believe this vision is outdated, especially since 
the development and adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, and Article 3(c) of the 
Protocol spells out a clear duty for the States to bring acts of genocide, including 
preparatory steps towards the accomplishment of such acts, to the attention of the proper 
forum. Those forums are the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council and 
relevant Regional Organizations. Those regional organizations which are considered 
relevant for the purpose of the Protocol are those which have been empowered by their 
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 I am referring here to Slide 4 – Information Flow of the accompanying PowerPoint presentation. 
17
 “The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.” 
6 
members to intervene to prevent or stop genocide in their region
18
. This is currently the 
case of the African Union
19
, notably, but it could involve other such organizations in the 
future, as decided by those organizations and their members. 
So what happens when the attention is brought at the UN or in a regional organization? 
Essentially, the members of that organization or organ deliberate according to their 
internal rules over whether the acts or preparatory steps could lead to genocide or 
constitute genocide
20
. My colleague may have made that point already, but the point is to 
lower the burden of proof so that it doesn’t act like a trial, but rather, the decision should 
be a collective acknowledgment of the duty to prevent genocide before it occurs, or if that 
failed, then to suppress it. This can be seen as an implementation of the responsibility to 
protect civilians from genocidal violence, essentially. Here, the obligation for states is to 
take a collective decision by assessing the acts and the risks. 
After they take the decision, if they acknowledge the risk or the nature of the act, then 
they have to take further steps, but the content of the steps will remain in the policy 
arena
21
. Keep in mind that the decision will be made in both organs of the UN, and 
possibly in one or more regional organization at the same time. This can serve in part as a 
check against the political paralysis that the UN Security Council can be prone to, 
perhaps even an incentive for it to act effectively or to avoid vetoing such questions – 
something which a growing number of States have called on the permanent members to 
do - but I would argue it’s also a way to involve the regions even more since they have 
the potential to be the most effective actors in genocide prevention within their region. 
The decision-making process, along with the requirements on national actors I will 
discuss shortly, would also mainstream mass atrocity prevention goals within the work of 
national, regional and international actors, thus strengthening R2P. 
 
Taking action 
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 Article 3 merely established the duty to take a decision, and collective action following that decision. 
7 
Once a decision is made, states have to take a certain number of internal steps, including 
conducting a review of their armed forces, police and equipment that could be made 
available to a UN mission or to a regional intervention to ensure the effective protection 
of civilians
22. The Protocol doesn’t mandate committing resources, but at the very least 
it’s liable to make states more proactive and hopefully speed up the long delays that can 
come before a peacekeeping mission is deployed, since states would have to be aware of 
their ability to commit personnel and equipment rapidly, possibly before the decision to 
deploy is made – if the early warning system works properly rather than wait for a late 
intervention when slaughter has started. They also have the obligation not to exclude the 
use of force to protect civilians in any mission in which they participate
23
. Most 
importantly, they are the wheels which move the other organs into actions. 
All decisions are obviously made according to the rules of the appropriate UN or regional 
organ. At the Security Council level, a decision is made by 9 out of 15 members, with the 
risk of vetoes. The Security Council already has all the tools it needs to take effective 
action, and under the Protocol retains its primacy in matters of international peace and 
security
24
. In other words, if the Security Council is doing its job, its decisions will be 
applied as they should be. One specific step it should take it to pre-authorize relevant 
Regional Organizations to intervene within their region following a decision recognizing 
a risk of genocide
25
. 
Assuming the Security Council fails to effective action, the General Assembly and 
relevant Regional Organizations have the power to make their recommendations binding 
on the States signatory to the Protocol according to article 4. At this time, the General 
Assembly has the competence to make recommendations on matters of international 
peace and security following the mechanisms of emergency sessions implemented 
following the Uniting for Peace resolution
26
. Such questions are decided by two-thirds 
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 To do otherwise would be to conflict with the Charter of the United Nations, which would ultimately 
mean the Protocol would become useless in a conflict of obligations between a binding Security Council 
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 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) “Uniting for peace” of November 3 1950 
establishes a system of emergency special session under which the general assembly can intervene on 
issues relating to international peace and security when the Security Council “because of lack of unanimity 
8 
majority, however, like all General Assembly recommendations, are nonbinding
27
. In 
regional organizations, they would be decided according to the mechanisms the members 
of the organization have implemented. 
By signing the Protocol, states would recognize those recommendations are binding, 
whether they come from the General Assembly or a Regional Organization, and carry the 
same weight as obligations stemming from the Charter
28
. In other words, they would 
prevail over obligations derived from treaties not linked to the Charter, allowing for 
effective smart sanctions regimes, for example. This is possible precisely because 
genocide prevention is compatible with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter 
and also because the Protocol is specifically attributing a competence to an existing organ 
of the United Nations that falls under its general broad mandate
29
. 
A specific measure that the General Assembly would have to take would be to finance 
regional interventions, when intervention is deemed necessary to prevent or halt 
genocide
30
. One recurring issue with peacekeeping is finding the funding for it. The idea 
here is not to solve all peacekeeping issue – that is not within the scope of the Protocol – 
but rather to make sure uncertain funding doesn’t become an obstacle when an 
emergency intervention is deemed necessary to prevent genocide. This would go a long 
way towards insuring that regional organizations that might be struggling with funding 
will not bear all the weight that is shifted to them from the larger international 
community. 
Speaking of peacekeeping, one disposition of the Protocol is that State Parties must 
collectively review the equipment, number and mandate of peacekeeping forces in a State 
or region where a risk of genocide is recognized, as well as the possibility of deployment, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression”. 
27
 The Charter is explicit in allowing the General Assembly to make recommendations, where the Security 
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its recommendations. 
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 In other words, they would prevail over other treaties in an event of a conflict of obligations, such as 
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the UN Charter is supposed to promote. 
30
 Article 5 (2) (b) 
9 
and make recommendations if appropriate
31. The Protocol doesn’t specify in which forum 
this would be done, and indeed this could be done in any of the three forums we’ve 
discussed, depending on who deployed the force in the first place, and also keeping in 
mind the idea of the complementarity of the organs. 
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